OAIC
Office of the Australian Information Commissioner
Privacy and freedom of information regulator. Administers the Privacy Act 1988, the Notifiable Data Breaches scheme, and the Australian Privacy Principles.
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Obligations enforced by OAIC (18)
- criticalCWLTHAPP 3 collection of sensitive information
APP 3 bars collecting sensitive information — health, race, religion, sexual orientation and more — without consent. What counts as sensitive, the exceptions and penalties.
- criticalCWLTHNotifiable Data Breach (NDB) scheme
Under the NDB scheme, APP entities must notify the OAIC and affected individuals of an eligible data breach likely to cause serious harm — assessed within 30 days.
- criticalCWLTHAutomated decision-making transparency in your privacy policy (APP 1.7–1.9)
From 10 December 2026, APP entities that use computer programs to make or substantially assist decisions that significantly affect individuals must say so in their APP privacy policy.
- highCWLTHAPP 8 cross-border disclosure
Before disclosing personal information overseas, APP 8 requires reasonable steps so the recipient meets the APPs — unless an exception applies. Steps and exceptions.
- highCWLTHPublish a Privacy Policy that meets APP 1
Every APP entity needs a clearly-expressed Privacy Policy covering APP 1.4 requirements.
- highCWLTHConsumer Data Right (CDR) participant accreditation + compliance
Banking, energy and (from July 2026) non-bank lending data holders must share consumer data with accredited recipients, and accredited recipients must comply with the privacy safeguards.
- highCWLTHAPP 12 & APP 13 access and correction requests
Individuals can ask to access (APP 12) and correct (APP 13) the personal information you hold — the strict response times, allowable refusals and how to comply.
- highCWLTHProvide an APP 5 collection notice at or before collection
APP 5 requires notice of identity, purposes, recipients, consequences of not providing info, and where Privacy Policy lives.
- highCWLTHComply with CDR Banking (Open Banking) — major + non-major ADIs
Banking data holders must share consumer data with accredited recipients on consumer consent.
- highCWLTHAPP 7 direct marketing: consent, opt-out & when you can't message (2026)
APP 7 restricts using or disclosing personal information for direct marketing and requires a simple opt-out — when it applies, the exceptions and penalties.
- highCWLTHCDR Energy sector — phased
Energy retailers + distributors must share data via CDR.
- highCWLTHRespond to FOI requests within 30 days (Cwlth agencies + ministers)
FOI Act 1982 — Commonwealth agencies + ministers must respond to access requests within 30 days.
- highCWLTHPrepare for the proposed removal of the small business exemption
Removing the Privacy Act small business exemption (<$3M turnover) is proposed for a future reform tranche — agreed in principle, not yet law.
- highCWLTHComply with credit reporting obligations (Part IIIA Privacy Act)
Credit providers and CRBs must adhere to the CR Code on collection, use, disclosure, hardship and dispute resolution.
- highCWLTHChildren's Online Privacy Code 2026
OAIC developing a mandatory children's online privacy code — must be registered by 10 December 2026 (commencement not yet fixed).
- highCWLTHPrivacy Act reform: controller and processor rules (Tranche 2 exposure draft, not yet law)
Proposed controller/processor rules in the Tranche 2 exposure draft (Privacy Amendment (Personal Data Protection) Bill 2026): consultation closed 18 September 2026, not yet introduced to Parliament.
- mediumCWLTHAPP 2 — anonymity + pseudonymity for individuals
Where reasonable, individuals must be able to deal with you anonymously or under a pseudonym.
- mediumCWLTHCDR action initiation: framework legislated (2024), no actions designated yet
The CDR framework allows accredited persons to initiate actions such as payments, but no action type has been designated yet.
Recent OAIC enforcement
- Australian Privacy Commissioner orders American Express Australia Limited to compensate complainant following interference in privacy
Australian Privacy Commissioner orders American Express Australia Limited to compensate complainant following interference in privacy
- Commissioner Initiated Investigation into Monash IVF Pty Ltd (Privacy) [2026] AICmr 40 (11 June 2026)
Commissioner Initiated Investigation into Monash IVF Pty Ltd (Privacy) [2026] AICmr 40 (11 June 2026). Finding: breach of APP 3.3; 5.1; 5.2 and 7.1. Remedies: Must not repeat or continue acts and practices found to be an interference with individuals’ privacy — Specified steps to address interference.
- Commissioner Initiated Investigation into Medmate Australia Pty Ltd (Privacy) [2026] AICmr 41 (11 June 2026)
Commissioner Initiated Investigation into Medmate Australia Pty Ltd (Privacy) [2026] AICmr 41 (11 June 2026). Finding: breach. OAIC's listing gives the legislative provision as APP 11.1, while its catchword summary for the entry lists APP 3.3, 5.1, 5.2 and 7.1 (collection of sensitive information via third-party tracking pixels). Remedies: Must not repeat or continue acts and practices found to be an interference with individuals' privacy — Specified steps to address interference.
- Commissioner Initiated Investigation into IRE Pty Ltd (Privacy) [2026] AICmr 24 (1 April 2026)
Commissioner Initiated Investigation into IRE Pty Ltd (Privacy) [2026] AICmr 24 (1 April 2026). Finding: breach of APP 3.2; 3.5. Remedies: Must not repeat or continue acts and practices found to be an interference with individuals’ privacy — Specified steps to address interference.
- Commissioner Initiated Investigation into Singtel Optus Pty Ltd (Privacy) [2026] AICmr 22 (20 March 2026)
Commissioner Initiated Investigation into Singtel Optus Pty Ltd (Privacy) [2026] AICmr 22 (20 March 2026). Finding: breach of APP 11.1.
- Commissioner Initiated Investigation into Vinomofo Pty Ltd (Privacy) [2025] AICmr 175 (17 October 2025)
Commissioner Initiated Investigation into Vinomofo Pty Ltd (Privacy) [2025] AICmr 175 (17 October 2025). Finding: breach of APP 11. Remedies: Must not repeat or continue acts and practices found to be an interference with individuals’ privacy — Specified steps to address interference.
- Australian Information Commissioner v Australian Clinical Labs Limited (No 2)
A Feb 2022 cyberattack on ACL's Medlab Pathology systems led to data on over 223,000 people being exfiltrated. ACL failed to take reasonable security steps, did not assess the suspected eligible data breach quickly enough and was slow to notify the Commissioner. First civil penalties ordered under the Privacy Act; ACL admitted liability and penalty was jointly proposed.
- OAIC investigation — Optus 2022 data breach
September 2022 Optus breach exposed ~10M customer records. OAIC alleges APP 11 failures + delayed notification.
- OAIC enforcement — multiple SMB breach investigations 2024
OAIC investigated multiple SMB-scale breaches in 2024 — including in legal, retail, healthcare. Most resolved without penalty but documented APP 11 reasonable-steps + NDB notification expectations.
- OAIC + AFP Medibank determination 2024-2025
Class action + OAIC determination on Medibank Oct 2022 data breach affecting ~9.7M customers + their families.
- Optus class action — 2022 data breach
Class action by ~9.8M Optus customers affected by September 2022 data breach.
- OAIC determination — Bunnings facial recognition + biometric
Bunnings operated facial recognition in stores for loss prevention without proper notice + consent for sensitive (biometric) information.
- OAIC determinations on Bunnings and Kmart facial recognition
Both retailers operated in-store facial recognition systems for loss-prevention. OAIC found inadequate notification and unjustified breach of APP 3.3 (sensitive information).
- OAIC determination — Kmart facial recognition
Kmart operated facial recognition for loss prevention; same proceedings as Bunnings determination 2024.
- OAIC investigation into Australian Clinical Labs (Medlab)
Following the February 2022 Medlab Pathology breach, OAIC alleges ACL failed to take reasonable steps to protect personal information and failed to properly notify the breach.
- OAIC investigation — Latitude Financial 2023 breach
March 2023 Latitude breach exposed personal info of ~14M customers including 7.9M driver licences.
- OAIC follow-up enforcement — Clearview AI compliance
Follow-up compliance from 2021 determination + ongoing biometric processing detected.
- OAIC v Medibank Private Limited
The October 2022 Medibank breach exposed personal information of approximately 9.7 million current and former customers. OAIC alleges Medibank failed to take reasonable steps to protect personal information.
- OAIC determination — Health Engine
Health Engine forwarded patient data to insurance brokers without proper consent.
- Commissioner-initiated investigation into Clearview AI Inc
Clearview AI scraped publicly available images from the web and used them to build a facial-recognition tool that was offered to Australian police agencies.
- Commissioner-initiated investigation into 7-Eleven Stores Pty Ltd
7-Eleven collected facial images and faceprints from customers via in-store tablets as part of a customer feedback program. Consent processes were inadequate.
- Commissioner v Uber Technologies (cross-border breach)
Uber failed to protect personal information of 1.2M Australian customers/drivers in the 2016 breach, and concealed the breach for over a year by paying the attacker as a 'bug bounty'.
- PageUp NDB incident (illustrative)
PageUp HR software experienced a security incident potentially exposing recruitment data of major Australian employers (CBA, Telstra, Coles, NAB). Quick public notification.